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1 
THE MEDIA AS PARTICIPANTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 
MONICA HAKIMI* 
INTRODUCTION 
For most of the foreign policy audience, the really effective political 
map of the world—that is to say, their operational map of the 
world—is drawn by the reporter and the editor, not by the cartog-
rapher. 
Bernard Cohen1 
We know what we know about current international events 
through the media.  The media (with their instantaneous transmission 
of images and sound across great distances) inform us of everything 
from the train bombings in Madrid and London, to human rights 
abuses in Darfur, to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  Yet the media 
do not simply communicate raw information; they selectively filter, 
define and give shape to the events that they cover—in terms of what 
is happening, whether it is appropriate, and how relevant interna-
tional actors should and do respond.  The media thus are the nerves 
of the international system, and, as mass communicators, they per-
form critical functions in the international legal process.2 
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 1. BERNARD COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 13 (1963).  
 2. This Article adopts the lens of the New Haven School of international legal jurispru-
dence.  The New Haven School understands international law, not as a set body of rules, but in 
terms of processes of decision that are consistent with expectations of what is "right," and that 
are effected through various controls.  For a thorough discussion on the New Haven School, see, 
for example, W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, 
86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118  (1992) [hereinafter View from New Haven]; W. Michael Reis-
man, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 101 
(1981) [hereinafter International Lawmaking ]. 
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The media’s effects on societies and individuals have been stud-
ied from a gamut of academic and political angles.3  In international 
legal scholarship, however, the media tend to be discussed briefly4 or 
in certain limited contexts, such as the use of the media to dissemi-
nate propaganda5 or the regulation and control of the media.6  There 
has not been any comprehensive study on the media’s functions in the 
international legal process.  The lack of scholarship in this regard is 
likely attributable, at least in part, to the facts that the media are un-
conventional participants, and that they oftentimes operate “behind 
the scenes”—as messengers for other actors and at deep levels of the 
public subconscious.  If anything, however, these characteristics in-
crease, rather than decrease, the media’s influence.  This Article ex-
amines that influence. 
In Part I of this Article, I put in context the question of the me-
dia’s influence in the international legal process.  That process is 
 
 3. For an analysis of the ways in which the media democratize society and increase cul-
tural plurality, see, for example, STANLEY J. BARAN & DENNIS K. DAVIS, MASS 
COMMUNICATION THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, FERMENT, AND FUTURE 7, 99 (2000) (describing 
the media as an independent social institution that keeps the government in check).  For an al-
ternative analysis, arguing that the media contribute to the demise of social tranquility and of 
the public sphere, see, for example, id. at 20-55; TIM O'SULLIVAN, ET. AL., KEY CONCEPTS IN 
COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL STUDIES 173-74 (1994) (describing the mass society theory, 
which contends that the media have a destructive influence on atomized and easily manipulated 
individuals); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., 
1989) (blaming the media for the demise of the public sphere).  For an argument that the media 
only moderately affect social organization, and that their ultimate messages depend on psycho-
logical and environmental factors among the audience for meaning, see, for example, Jennings 
Bryant & Richard L. Street, From Reactivity to Activity and Action: An Evolving Concept and 
Weltanschauung in Mass and Interpersonal Communication, in ADVANCING COMMUNICATION 
SCIENCE: MERGING MASS AND INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES 162 (Robert P. Hawkins, et al. 
eds., 1988). 
 4. See, e.g., Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Custom? , in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 317, 323-24 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte ed., 
2003) (noting that the media contribute to the "public conscious" and play a role in policyma k-
ing); Onuma Yasuaki, International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of In-
ternational Law in International Society , 14 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 105, 125 (2003) (noting that when 
governments sign and ratify a treaty, they generally work "to persuade domestic and interna-
tional media institutions" of the treaty's value).  
 5. See, e.g., B.S. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF COERCION (1968); Llezlie L. Green, 
Gender Hate Propaganda and Sexual Violence in the Rwandan Genocide: An Argument for In-
tersectionality in International Law, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 733 (2002).  
 6. See, e.g., Lewis E. Schnurr, Media and Telecommunications Regulation and the Internet: 
Regulate or Strangulate? , MEDIA L. & POL'Y Spring 2000, at 11, 17-18 (2000); Alison Harcourt, 
The European Commission and Regulation of the Media Industry, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 425 (1998).  
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characterized by significant communicative gaps that the media help 
fill.  In Part II, I analyze the media’s functions at every stage of the in-
ternational legal process—from the prescription of international law, 
to its codification, invocation, application and even termination.  In 
Part III, I address systemic factors that impede media performance, 
demonstrating that, although the media perform important legal func-
tions, they do not perform those functions perfectly.  In Part IV, I 
consider efforts to minimize these imperfections.  I conclude that the 
media will continue to operate imperfectly but as unique and special-
ized partic ipants in the international legal process.  The goal, then, is 
to recognize both the media’s functions and their limits so that we, as 
international scholars and practitioners, can work within that process 
to achieve desirable legal and policy outcomes. 
I.  THE MEDIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 
All legal processes are processes of communication.7  In munici-
pal legal systems, the relevant communications generally occur 
through institutionalized mechanisms, such that a State’s legislature 
communicates the content of a law through the language of the legis-
lation, and sometimes also through accompanying legislative history, 
and the courts may then communicate interpretations, refinements 
and modifications of the law in the orders and decisions that they is-
sue.8  To the extent that a court communicates an understanding of 
the law with which the legislature disagrees, the legislature may com-
municate that fact through subsequent legislation.9  In this way, the 
legislature and the courts continually communicate with each other 
and with the relevant community concerning the law’s substantive 
content. 
These institutionalized mechanisms of communication are not 
well developed in the international system.  Although the interna-
 
 7. See Reisman, International Lawmaking, supra note 2, at 105-08. "Put in simplest terms, 
lawmaking or the prescribing of policy as authoritative for a community is a process of commu-
nication." See also id. at 105. 
 8. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democ-
racy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 133-34 (2002) (describing the dialogue between the judiciary and 
the legislature); William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci-
sions, 101 YALE L. J. 331 (1991).  
 9. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L.  & 
ARTS 187, 197-98 (2004) (referencing the legislature's corrective response to judicial communi-
cations); William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 371 (1990) (also referencing the legislature's corrective response to 
judicial communications). 
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tional legal system may in some instances communicate a law’s policy 
content through “legislation,” and although that legislation may from 
time to time be interpreted or applied by international courts or tri-
bunals, the legislative and judicial mechanisms of communication are 
not as comprehensive in the international system as they are in mu-
nicipal systems.10  Much international law is not legislated, but rather 
established in the form of custom over time, and modifications or re-
finements of the law come, not from the judiciary, but from a variety 
of unorganized components, including but not limited to States, in-
ternational organizations, major corporations, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, and large terrorist groups.11  Despite this informal and 
disorganized nature of the international legal process, communication 
is nevertheless essential for the international norms to have the force 
of law, in terms of their meaning for and intended effect on the rele-
vant community.  In the absence of institutionalized channels, inter-
national legal communications often occur through the open lines of 
the media.  The media, in other words, fill the communicative gaps in 
the international legal process. 
In filling these gaps, the media are unique from more conven-
tional international actors—and, by conventional actors, I primarily 
mean States, international organizations, and even nongovernmental 
organizations12—in that the media do not have a defined institutional 
role in the international legal process.  Indeed, their role is so amor-
phous that the media are not seen as participants at all.  The media do 
not “have a seat at the table” at international legal conferences, they 
do not participate in international organizations or nongovernmental 
organizations, and they generally are not considered proper subjects 
of international law.13  Rather, the media participate in the interna-
tional process by operating in the background and at deep levels of 
 
 10. See Reisman, International Lawmaking , supra  note 2, at 103. 
 11. See Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 123. 
 12. As for the increasing "conventionality" of NGOs, see, for example, Jost Delbrück, 
Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of Allocating Public Authority Beyond the 
State, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 43-44 (2004) (noting some of the roles that NGOs 
play in the international legal process and describing them as "limited deriv ative legal subjects 
under secondary rules of international law"); Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovern-
mental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 611 (1994) (de-
scribing the increasingly important role that NGOs play in international judicial proceedings).  
 13. For a discussion of the proper subjects of international law, see generally, IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (1998);  MALCOLM N. SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 137-39 (1997). 
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the public subconscious.  As I discuss below, this makes them quite 
powerful, and also potentially quite dangerous. 
II.  THE MEDIA’S POSITIVE FUNCTIONS 
Because communication is essential throughout the international 
legal process, the media, as communicative gap-fillers, participate at 
every stage of that process.  To varying degrees, they participate in 
the prescription, codification, invocation, application, and termination 
of international law.  In this Part, I consider the media’s functions 
during each of these stages of the international legal process. 
Yet before examining, as a general matter, the media’s functions 
in the international legal process, I consider for background a con-
crete case in which media participation was critical: the case of the 
Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse “scandal”  in Iraq.  This media “scandal” 
erupted in April 2004, when photographs depicting prisoner mis-
treatment were aired on CBS’ 60 Minutes II.14  Yet “news” of that 
mistreatment existed long before the CBS broadcast.  Between March 
and November 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) claimed to have documented or observed numerous instances 
of mistreatment at Abu Ghraib—including the hooding and beating 
of detainees and acts of humiliation that would later incite such a 
strong public response.15  According to the ICRC, it regularly brought 
these instances of mistreatment to the attention of coalition forces, 
both orally and in writing, throughout 2003.16  Moreover, during the 
end of 2003, the U.S. military itself began investigating the matter.  
The investigation by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command 
“uncovered numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail 
detainee abuse by Military Police personnel . . . .”17  A different U.S. 
 
 14. 60 Minutes II: Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 28, 
2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml (last vis-
ited July 15, 2005). 
 15. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the 
Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in 
Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (February 2004) [hereinafter ICRC Report], in 
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 383, 390-93 (Karen J. Greenberg & 
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005); see also Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Found Abuses at Abu Ghraib 
Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at A13; CBS News, Abuses at Abu Ghraib: Timeline, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml (follow "Interactive: Abuse 
at Abu Ghraib" hyperlink; then follow "Timeline" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 7, 2005). 
 16. See ICRC Report, supra note 15, at 385. 
 17. The Taguba Report: Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade 
(March 2004), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 405, 415 (Karen J. 
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).  
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military investigation, commenced in mid-January 2004,18 culminated 
in a March 2004 report by a Major General Antonio M. Taguba, who 
found ample evidence—in the form of written confessions, detainee 
statements and witness statements—of detainee mistreatment.19 
The findings of the ICRC and of the U.S. military investigations 
had been kept confidential, but relatively modest reports of mis-
treatment trickled into the public domain as early as the spring or 
summer of 2003.20  Further, in mid-January 2004, when the Pentagon 
initiated the investigation that would result in the Taguba Report, it 
announced publicly that it had begun an inquiry into the matter.21  
Nevertheless, until the 60 Minutes broadcast in April 2004, any dis-
cussion of detainee mistreatment in the press tended to be only cur-
sory and relegated to back pages in the print media.22  The public, for 
the most part, seemed unaware of the issue. 
This all changed when 60 Minutes devoted an entire segment to 
Abu Ghraib, airing photographs that made real the acts perpetrated 
by individuals in the U.S. military police.  The broadcast aroused pub-
lic attention and suddenly sparked a media “scandal,” with photo-
graphs of the mistreatment appearing on the front pages of newspa-
pers and on major television news programs around the world.23  The 
 
 18. Id. at 407. 
 19. Id. at 416  (documenting that U.S. military police had arranged detainees in sexually 
explicit positions for photographing, had arranged them naked in a pile and then jumped on 
them, had placed dog chains around their necks while they were naked, had had sex with at least 
one detainee, and had used military dogs to intimidate detainees).  
 20. See Peter Slevin, System Failures Cited for Delayed Action on Abuses, WASH. POST, 
May 20, 2004, at A19 ("On May 15, [2003,] five weeks after major combat operations ended, 
Amnesty International publicized what it considered cases of ill treatment and raised its evi-
dence with U.S. military pe rsonnel.").  Cf. Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, In Abuse, a Portrayal of 
Ill-Prepared, Overwhelmed G.I.'s, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2004, at A1 (describing a May 2003 inci-
dent of abuse that later became the subject of testimony presented in a court-martial). 
 21. See Who Knew of Abuses and When, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A12 ("Pentagon offi-
cials said the photographs [depicting the abuses] were described in general terms to [Secretary 
of Defense] Rumsfeld in mid-January."); Eric Schmitt, Inquiry Ordered Into Reports of Prisoner 
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at A7. 
 22. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, U.S. Soldiers Charged in Abuse of Iraqis, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 
2004, at A21 (974 word story on page A21); Schmitt, supra note 20 (367 word story on page A7); 
Eight Marine Reservists Face Charges in POWs' Treatment; Two Charged with Negligent Homi-
cide in Death of Iraqi, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at A23 (475 word story on page A23). 
 23. See, e.g., Jim VandeHei, Kerry Assails Bush on Iraq; Senator Says War Is 'Misman-
aged,' WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at A01 (referring to "pictures of the abused prisoners [that] 
were plastered on television screens worldwide"); David Carr, News Media Quandary over 
Showing Graphic Images of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at A14 (discussing the publica-
tion and broadcast of the images in newspapers and on television); Sarah Lyall, Europeans Like 
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public response in the United States and abroad became intense, and 
the Bush Administration suddenly found itself responding publicly 
and quite extensively to an issue that it had managed quietly for 
months.  Within days of the 60 Minutes broadcast, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld testified before Congress, apologized publicly for 
the abuses,24 and flew to the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq to condemn 
the mistreatment of detainees and to pledge that the United States 
would appropriately punish any wrongdoers.25  President Bush also 
condemned the abuses, appearing on two Arabic language television 
networks to label them “abhorrent” deviations from U.S. morals.26 
The media played a critical role in disseminating intelligence 
about Abu Ghraib, in invoking and applying the relevant interna-
tional legal norms, and in communicating the responses of the rele-
vant international actors.  For its part, the U.S. Government re-
sponse, at least as reflected in public statements, was to uphold the 
violated international norms and to commit to taking appropriate en-
forcement actions.27  The Abu Ghraib prison case thus exemplifies the 
media’s participation during various stages of the international legal 
process.  With this example in mind, I turn to a more general and sys-
tematic analysis of the media’s functions at each such stage. 
A. Prescription 
Prescription or lawmaking occurs when a series of communica-
tions create in a target audience a set of expectations about policy 
content, authority and control.28  Prescription may be accomplished 
 
Bush Even Less than Before, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at Sec. 1.4 (referring to "pictures show-
ing the humiliation of Iraqi prisoners [that] were published all over the world"). 
 24. Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, Rumsfeld Accepts Blame and Offers Apology in Abuse, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at A1. 
 25. Thom Shanker, At Iraqi Prison, Rumsfeld Vows to Punish Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 
2004, at A1. 
 26. Christine Hauser, Many Iraqis are Skeptical of Bush TV Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 
2004, at A16. 
 27. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld each underscored that the abuses were devia-
tions from the norm and inconsistent with American values.  See id.; Shanker & Schmitt, supra 
note 24.  Each also promised that the wrongdoers would be brought to justice.  See id.; White 
House Press Release (May 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040506-1.html.  In addition, Secretary 
Rumsfeld stated that he was seeking compensation for prisoners whose abuse included certain 
sexual acts.  See Shanker & Schmitt, supra note 24. 
 28. Reisman, International Lawmaking , supra note 2; Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael 
Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law is 
Made, 6 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 249, 250 (1980). 
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by a legislature or by some other organized body, but in international 
law it is largely accomplished through informal communications, such 
as public statements and actions, that result in the establishment of 
custom.29  These informal communications are often transmitted 
through, or otherwise covered by, the media.  As such, the media help 
establish the substantive policy that ultimately becomes law. 
But helping to establish the substantive policy is only one way in 
which the media participate in the lawmaking process.  The media 
also participate in that process by helping to define its parameters; 
they identify decision-makers, disperse intelligence, and allocate 
communal values.30  These process-oriented functions are inextricably 
linked to the function of substantive lawmaking, because the sub-
stance of a law will vary according to the person who makes it, the in-
formation before him or her, and the policies and values that he or 
she perceives to be at stake.  In this Section, I discuss the media’s role 
with respect to each of these lawmaking functions. 
1. Identifying Decision-Makers.  In order for substantive policy 
to have the effect of “law,” the actors that prescribe it must, in the 
minds of the prescription audience, have appropriate levels of author-
ity and control.31  A mobster is simply a criminal, and not a lawmaker, 
because although he makes enforceable policy decisions, the public 
does not perceive him to be a legitimate lawmaker.  In other words, 
the mobster is not viewed by the relevant audience as having the au-
thority to make law.  This public perception is based on a complex in-
terplay of societal and institutional factors, including the facts that the 
mobster is not in an official position of authority, and that he acts ex-
tra-legally.  But these specific factors are not necessarily sufficient to 
deny the mobster legitimacy.  The freedom fighter also lacks an offi-
cial position of authority and acts extra-legally, but, unlike the mob-
ster, the freedom fighter’s supporters view him as a legitimate partici-
pant in the legal process.  The freedom fighter occupies a position of 
authority that the mobster does not because (of the two of them) the 
relevant audiences perceive only the freedom fighter as being a le-
 
 29. See Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 123. 
 30. Professors McDougal and Reisman identified these functions as inherent in the pre-
scriptive process.  See Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, International Law in Policy-
Oriented Perspective, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 103, 107 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. 
Johnston eds., 1983) 
 31. See Reisman, International Lawmaking , supra note 2. 
01_HAKIMI.DOC  3/1/2006   12:49 PM 
2006] THE MEDIA AS PARTICI PANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS  9 
gitimate decision-maker.  The audience’s perceptions thus help de-
termine whether an actor will have the legitimacy to participate in the 
lawmaking process.32  The media influence these perceptions, and 
thus help identify decision-makers, in the manner and the substance 
of their coverage. 
Especially in their coverage of public international events, the 
media tend to identify as decision-makers those who already occupy 
positions of authority and who, therefore, already participate in the 
international legal process.33  These decision-makers include presi-
dents or prime ministers of powerful States and heads of prominent 
international organizations, such as the United Nations or the Euro-
pean Community.  They also include certain less conventional actors, 
such as multinational corporations and major terrorist groups.  In 
these cases, media coverage usually does not introduce the prescrip-
tive audience to the decision-makers, but does reaffirm the roles that 
these actors play in the lawmaking process.  Media attention to high-
level State officials, for example, both reflects and reinforces the posi-
tions of authority that the prescriptive audience endows upon those 
officials. 
In addition to identifying as decision-makers actors that partic i-
pate frequently in the international process, the media sometimes in-
troduce the audience to new or more specialized decision-makers.  
With respect to these decision-makers, the media tend to focus on 
those who, because of context or circumstance, are uniquely situated 
to make or influence public order decisions.  This is often the case 
with “talking heads” who have relevant expertise or experience, and 
who may be featured in the media to explain a particular inc ident or 
policy proposal.  It is also the case for specia lized interest groups, 
such as human rights organizations that use the media to publicize 
their work; media attention highlights the organization’s activ ities and 
may make it politically inexpedient for conventional actors to ignore 
or impede those activities.34 
 
 32. See id. at 110 (noting that the audience endows the prescriber with the authority that 
renders his or her communication a lawmaking activity).  
 33. See TED GALEN CARPENTER, THE CAPTIVE PRESS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1995) (noting characteristics of the symbiotic relationship between gov-
ernment officials and members of the news media). 
 34. For instance, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) website lists the incidents for which 
HRW reports have led to a response by conventional international actors.  See, e.g., Papua New 
Guinea: Police Respond to HRW Brutality Charge, http://www.hrw.org/update/2005/10 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2005) (noting that a HRW report documenting police brutality in Papua New 
Guinea prompted the country's police minister to publicly acknowledge those findings and to 
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Finally, the media may identify as decision-makers actors that, 
before media attention, were wholly outside the international legal 
process.  The Falun Gong, for example, was practically unheard of in 
the West until, in the face of Beijing’s crackdown in the late 1990s,35 it 
actively solicited coverage and sympathy from the Western media.36  
The strategy was successful.  A few weeks after the surge of attention 
by the Western media, the European Union publicly disapproved of 
Beijing’s crackdown on “dissenters”—naming the Falun Gong, in par-
ticular37—and the U.S. State Department’s annual report on human 
rights referenced Beijing’s actions against the Falun Gong as evidence 
of China’s poor human rights conditions.38  Media attention thus in-
creased the likelihood and intensity of the international response in 
favor of the Falun Gong.  Once the media propelled the Falun Gong 
into the public sphere, conventional international actors considered 
the group in subsequent policy decisions, such that even the act of 
“not dealing” would be an act of considering but rejecting. 
In sum, media coverage identifies actors as legitimate decision-
makers in the international legal process.  The media tend to identify 
those who already occupy positions of authority in the eyes of the 
prescriptive audience, but they sometimes also introduce the audi-
ence to new actors.  In either event, the actor identified by the media 
may come to participate (directly or indirectly) in the decision-
making process. 
2. Dispersing Intelligence.  With respect to establishing the pa-
rameters of the prescriptive process, the media are perhaps most in-
 
express his intention to cure the problems); Uzbekistan: HRW Blocks Refugee Return, 
http://www.hrw.org/update/2005/09 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (noting that HRW's activities con-
tributed to the United Nations airlift of 439 Uzbek refugees to safety).  The Amnesty Interna-
tional website also lists its "achievements."  See http://www.web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutai-
goodnews-eng?open=&target=goodnews&source=homepage_banner (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). 
 35. See Erik Eckholm, China Sentences 4 in Spiritual Group to Long Jail Time, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 27, 1999, at A1. 
 36. See Mark Landler, Spiritual Group Meets in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at 
A12; Erik Eckholm, China Sect Members Covertly Meet Press and Ask World's Help, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at A10. 
 37. World Briefing: China: Pressed by Europe on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1999, at 
A16. 
 38. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 
1999  COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CHINA (Feb. 23, 2000), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/284.htm.  According to officials in the Clinton Admini-
stration, Beijing's treatment of the Falun Gong provided the driving force behind the report's 
sharp language.  See Jane Perlez, U.S. Report Harshly Criticizes China for Deterioration of Hu-
man Rights; Russia Also Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A8. 
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fluential in their function of dispersing intelligence because, in per-
forming this function, the media shape the knowledge that serves as 
the input for future decision-making.  The media do not simply com-
municate raw information, but rather gather, process and organize 
such information into meaningful intelligence that their audiences can 
digest.  Because the dispersal of intelligence involves these human 
acts of filtering, all intelligence transmitted through the media is, in a 
sense, “constructed.”  The media, in other words, define and give 
shape to the global reality. 
In addition to defining “reality” for the media audience, and 
therefore shaping the knowledge and input for future decision-
making, the media-constructed intelligence influences the interna-
tional legal process at a deeper level of the subconscious—by influ-
encing expectations about policy content, authority, and control.  
Those expectations then play out in the prescriptive process.  I discuss 
this second aspect in greater detail below. 
Most of the intelligence dispersed by the news media implicates 
conventional international actors and thus reinforces expectations 
concerning those actors’ positions in the international legal process.  
The news media constantly cover contemporaneous issues on the 
agendas of local or State officials, and of major international organi-
zations.  Yet, even where the media do not directly cover those agen-
das, conventional international actors are frequently implicated by 
the intelligence that the media disperse because those actors define 
the political order that gives the intelligence social meaning. 
For example, when the news media covered the tsunami of De-
cember 2004, they did not simply report the occurrence and effects of 
the tsunami.  Rather, they placed the incident in the context of the 
broader international order: they reported on the countries hardest 
hit,39 on the nationalities of the victims not from the region,40 and on 
efforts to provide assistance by various unaffected actors, including 
 
 39. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Powell, Praising Relief Effort, Views Sri Lanka Devastation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at A9 (noting then-current death tolls in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
India); Robert D. McFadden, Relief Delivery Lags as Deaths Pass 140,000 , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
2005, at A1 ("After Indonesia, Sri Lanka was the country next hardest hit."). 
 40. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, From Image of Disaster to a Safe Homecoming , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
3, 2005, at A10 ("Swedish officials say their nation is the hardest hit among Scandinavian coun-
tries . . . ."); John Lancaster, Toll from Tsunami Rises Above 25,000; Threat of Hunger, Disease 
Looms As Reeling Nations Appeal for Aid , WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2004, at A1 ("In Sri Lanka, at 
least 72 foreign tourists, including two Americans, died in the disaster."). 
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major States and humanitarian organizations.41  By assigning meaning 
to the tsunami in terms of the already constructed social and political 
order, the mediated intelligence reinforced the audience’s expecta-
tions concerning how international actors should respond and who 
among the potential actors could act most quickly or capably.  Thus, 
President Bush was criticized for responding slowly and with an insuf-
ficient contribution on behalf of the United States; in response, the 
President significantly increased his monetary pledge to a level more 
consistent with the public’s perceptions of the role and capacity of the 
United States in responding to the consequences of natural disas-
ters.42  The news reports of the tsunami perhaps also contributed to 
the perception, at least among audiences in the developed world, of 
disorder and a lack of preparedness in the developing countries that 
were hardest hit.43  These expectations and perceptions are based on 
already existing social constructs, but the media-constructed intelli-
gence also helps reinforce or shape those constructs in ways that play 
out in the lawmaking process. 
The media, then, have incredible power to define reality and 
shape public expectations through the intelligence that they disperse.  
What’s more, the media are uniquely situated to perform this func-
tion because they are often presumed to be detached transmitters of 
information and have the technologies for mass communication and 
the expertise to quickly gather and process information.  At least in 
open societies, these factors contribute to the public trust that the 
news media serve as the “watchdog” on the government, and that 
they expose intelligence, even if government officials would rather 
keep it out of the public sphere.44 
 
 41. See, e.g., Wayne Arnold, In Areas All but Unreachable, Helicopter Crews Bring Help, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A10 (describing U.S. relief effort s); Scott Shane, Pledges Grow, 
Hurdles Loom in Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A1 (discussing aid from the U.S., 
German, and Japanese Governments, as well as from the United Nations and Doctors Without 
Borders).  
 42. See Michael Getler, Aftershocks from Asia , WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2005, at B6; David E. 
Sanger & Warren Hoge, U.S. Vows Big Rise in Aid for Victims of Asian Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 2005, at A1. 
 43. See HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS: A STUDY OF CBS EVENING NEWS, 
NBC NIGHTLY NEWS, NEWSWEEK AND TIME 53 (1979) (noting that natural disasters in devel-
oping countries may lead to stories that focus on the social or moral disorder that surround the 
circumstances of the disaster). 
 44. Much has been written about the media as a "fourth estate" that serves as a "watch-
dog" on the government and that checks the integrity of democratic processes.  See, e.g., BARAN 
& DAVIS, supra note 3; Christina S. Drale, Communication Media in a Democratic Society , 9 
COMM. L. POL'Y 213, 224 (2004). 
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3. Specifying Substantive Policies.  The lawmaking process re-
quires the specification of substantive policies that, with time, trans-
form into law.  The media help specify these policies both by serving 
as messengers for more conventional actors and by developing sub-
stantive policies themselves. 
Most frequently, the media help specify substantive policies by 
communicating the policy positions of other international actors.45  
Conventional actors frequently use the media for this purpose.  They 
issue official statements, they hold press conferences,46 they give 
speeches, and they conduct interviews with an eye toward attracting 
media attention and communicating the substance of their message to 
the broader public.47  Because in communicating these messages the 
media make clear that the messages belong to the conventional actor, 
and not to the editor or producer of the particular medium, the com-
munication maintains its signal of authority.  And, to the extent that 
such communication is reinforced over time, the underlying substan-
tive policy eventually transforms into law.48 
Less conventional actors also use the media to communicate to 
broad audiences their substantive policy positions.  Osama Bin 
Laden, for example, has quite successfully used the international me-
dia to broadcast his anti-American positions.49  Similarly, once the 
media identified the Falun Gong as an international decision-maker, 
that group successfully employed the media to spread its message.50 
 
 45. See James Carey, Journalists Just Leave: The Ethics of an Anomalous Profession, THE 
MEDIA AND MORALITY 39, 51, 53 (Robert M. Baird, William E. Loges, & Stuart E. Rosenbaum 
eds., 1999) (describing the media as "middlemen" between the State and the public).  
 46. Press conferences pretend to exist for the benefit of the physically present audience, 
which may consist of journalists, other leaders, or a sample of the population, but such confer-
ences in fact target the mass audience (or particular actors within the mass audience) of the me-
dia.  See GANS, supra note 45, at 123.  Moreover, press conferences purposefully create an im-
age for the audience that consists of more tha n the speaker's words.  The speaker's dress, 
audience, backdrop, and companions on the podium all target a particular conception of policy.  
The press conference thus communicates a policy perspective based on the totality of con-
structed images.  Telephone  Interview with Josh Gottheimer, Domestic Speechwriter for Presi-
dent Clinton, in New Haven, Conn. (Feb. 14, 2000). 
 47. See HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 21 (1979) ("Much as the journalist may 
resent it, he performs a partly government function. . . . Officials seek him out to bring their pet 
projects to general attention, to settle scores, or to reverse a decision that went against them.").  
 48. See Reisman, International Lawmaking , supra note 2. 
 49. See, e.g., Alexander Stille, Cameras Shoot Where Uzis Can't, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 
2003, at B9; Edward Wong, G.I.'s Kill Scores of Militia Forces in 3 Iraqi Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 
8, 2004, at A1; Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: Wartime Economy; U.S. Tries to Ease Jit-
ters on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at A1. 
 50. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
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Although the media usually communicate the substantive poli-
cies of other actors, they sometimes specify substantive policies them-
selves.  The media do this in all sorts of ways, but different types of 
media tend to employ different techniques.  The traditional news me-
dia, for example, tend to communicate policy judgments through their 
decisions on cover selection, font size, and the amount of time or 
print allocated to a news story.51  Thus, when these media believe that 
a news story is important, they print it on the front page and above 
the fold, or they broadcast it as “headline” news.  These decisions as 
to format contribute to the formulation of communal policy because 
front-page or headline stories are more likely to attract public atten-
tion and to elicit comments from conventional actors.  By contrast, 
media that are not constrained by the desire to appear “objective”—
and this would include editorial pages and internet weblogs –— may 
communicate policy choices directly to the audience.  Other media, 
such as movies and television dramas, may specify policy preferences 
by endorsing or condemning particular social or political norms, usu-
ally in a fictional context.  The U.S. movie media, for example, tend 
to endorse American sentiments against terrorism, drug smuggling 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.52 
In sum, the media participate in the lawmaking process by speci-
fying substantive policies that, with time, transform into law.  The 
media usually specify the policies of other international actors, such 
as those of state officials conveyed through public statements or press 
conferences.  In addition, the media themselves sometimes specify 
policies, by indicating which stories are important or by explicitly en-
dorsing particular policies. 
4. Allocating Values.  Finally, the media help establish the pa-
rameters of the prescriptive process by allocating among different ac-
tors certain systemic values, such as power, enlightenment, and com-
munal loyalty.53 The media usually allocate these values concurrently 
 
 51. GANS, supra note 45, at 111 (describing the process by which magazines and television 
news shows select and prepare their cover or lead stories). 
 52. See, e.g., THE SIEGE (Twentieth Century Fox 1998) (terrorism); AIR FORCE ONE (Co-
lumbia/Tristar Studios 1997) (terrorism); CRIMSON TIDE (Disney Studios 1995) (non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons); CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER (Paramount Pictures 1994) 
(drug smuggling); PATRIOT GAMES (Paramount Pictures 1992) (terrorism); THE HUNT FOR 
RED OCTOBER (Paramount Pictures 1990) (non-proliferation of nuclear weapons). 
 53. The New Haven School identifies a number of values as being at stake in the interna-
tional legal process, including power, enlightenment, health, skill, well-being, affection, respect, 
and rectitude.  See Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 122.  
01_HAKIMI.DOC  3/1/2006   12:49 PM 
2006] THE MEDIA AS PARTICI PANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS  15 
with performing their other prescriptive functions.  Thus, when the 
media identify a decision-maker, that actor’s power to influence the 
legal process may increase accordingly.  Similarly, when the media 
disperse intelligence, they contribute to the enlightenment of the au-
dience, including the elite members of the audience who may be deci-
sion-makers themselves.  Moreover, the nature and focus of the intel-
ligence may help shape the audience’s loyalties to the different myth 
systems and ideas that comprise individual or group identities.54 
The media are particularly influential in the allocation of com-
munal loyalties.  Monroe Price discusses this dynamic in terms of a 
“market for loyalties”: 
The sellers in this market are all those for whom myths and dreams 
and history can somehow be converted into power and wealth—
classically states, governments, interest groups, and others.  The 
“buyers” are the citizens, subjects, nationals, consumers—recipients 
of the packages of information, propaganda, advertisements, 
drama, and news propounded by the media.  The consumer “pays” 
for one set of identities or another in several ways that, together, 
we call “loyalty” or “citizenship.”  Payment, however, is not ex-
pressed in the ordinary coin of the realm: It includes not only com-
pliance with tax obligations, but also obedience to laws, readiness 
to fight in the armed services, or even continued residence within 
the country.  The buyer also pays with his or her own sense of iden-
tity.55 
The market for loyalties that Professor Price describes takes place 
with respect to the establishment of national loyalties, as well as of 
loyalties across or within national boundaries.56  In the United States, 
identities are established, for example, among those who regularly lis-
ten, read, or watch a particular medium, such as the Weekly Standard 
or The Rush Limbaugh Show.  Similarly, foreign language media al-
low immigrant communities in the United States to continue to con-
nect and identify with their countries of origin. 
Because the media are so powerful in establishing communal 
loyalties, international actors have an incentive to manipulate the 
 
 54. See Monroe Price, The Market for Loyalties: The Electronic Media and Global Compe-
tition for Allegiances, 104 YALE L.J. 667, 678-79 (1994); Horace Newcomb & Paul M. Hirsch, 
Television as a Cultural Forum, in TELEVISION: THE CRITICAL VIEW 561, 562 (Horace New-
comb ed., 2000) (noting that the ritual model of communication views media communications as 
being directed toward "the maintenance of society in time").  Cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON, 
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1991) (explaining the press as a means through which imagined na-
tional communities develop). 
 55. Price, supra note 54, at 669-70. 
 56. See id.; W. PHILLIPS DAVISON, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 62 
(1965). 
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media for this purpose.57  International actors regularly use the media 
to influence the loyalties of audiences either in their own countries or 
transnationally.58  During the Cold War, the United States and the 
Soviet Union each spent millions broadcasting in developing coun-
tries the news of world events through the capitalist or communist 
(respectively) lens.59  Similarly, after September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
Government worked to “sell” its image to audiences in the Middle 
East.  The Bush Administration appointed a former advertising ex-
ecutive, Charlotte Beers, as Under Secretary of State for Public Di-
plomacy, and high-level Administration officials started appearing on 
Arabic-language television networks to portray a positive image of 
the United States to the audiences of those media.60 
In short, in their function of allocating communal values, the me-
dia help determine the resources that each actor will have in the deci-
sion-making process.  The dispersal of intelligence, in particular, con-
tributes to the audience’s enlightenment, and the nature and focus of 
such intelligence help shape communal loyalties. 
B. Codification 
Codification is the reduction of rules to an authoritative code to 
govern future interactions.  In international law, a codified rule  some-
times presents itself in the form of a written code, yet more often the 
rule remains unwritten (until applied) but with broad consensus as to 
its content.  In these instances, the international legal rule is “codi-
fied” when there is broad consensus that State practice has developed 
into binding custom.61  The media play a role in building that consen-
sus because of the way in which their communications reflect and re-
inforce already-existent communal norms.62 
 
 57. See Price, supra note 54, at 672-79. 
 58. See infra  notes 102-108 and accompanying text (discussing propaganda in greater de-
tail).  
 59. See DAVISON, supra note 57, at 195; ENRIQUE GONZALEZ-MANET, THE HIDDEN WAR 
OF INFORMATION 69-76 (Laurien Alexandre trans., 1988). Initiated during the Cold War's in-
cipient stages, the Voice of America was reinvigorated in the mid-1980s, such that its annual 
budget surpassed $116 million in 1983. Id. 
 60. See Elizabeth Becker, In the War on Terrorism, a Battle to Shape Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2001, at A1. 
 61. For a discussion of the various ways in which international law is "codified," see Sha b-
tai Rosenne, Codification of International Law, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 632 (1992). 
 62. See KATHRYN C. MONTGOMERY, TARGET: PRIME TIME 6 (1989) (noting that the me-
dia reflect and shape the dominant values and norms in society); Diane M. Glass, Portia in 
Primetime: Women Lawyers, Television, and L.A. Law , 2 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 371, 411 
01_HAKIMI.DOC  3/1/2006   12:49 PM 
2006] THE MEDIA AS PARTICI PANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS  17 
The media are products of their own social and political env i-
ronments, and those environments shape the manner in which media 
actors (e.g., journalists, editors, and producers) define the world.  For 
example, as discussed above, the U.S. movie media tend to reflect and 
reinforce—that is, help codify—international legal norms against ter-
rorism, smuggling, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion.63 
Because the media are products of their own social and political 
environments, media from different parts of the world may codify the 
same legal norms in different ways, or may codify different legal 
norms altogether.  For instance, Al Jazeera and other transnational, 
Arabic-language media have received significant attention for their 
reports involving the United States and Israel.64  As Fouad Ajami ex-
plained, Al Jazeera communicates a pan-Arabic perspective, the 
“dark side” of which “is an aggressive mix of anti-Americanism and 
anti-Zionism.”65  The Arabic-language media do not create these 
norms against the United States and Israel so much as they help solid-
ify and even justify them.  The norms themselves are deeply embed-
ded in the audience’s social fabrics, and therefore in the social fabrics 
of the Arabic-language media.66  These media thus “confirm”,” for 
example, that American and Israeli actions in the region equate with 
terrorism, and that acts of aggression in response may be appropri-
ate.67  The norms against the United States and Israel then play out in 
 
(1990) (noting that the media, and particularly the television media, reinforce or extend colle c-
tively -perceived norms).  See also supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (referencing in the 
context of the December 2004 tsunami the media's ability to reinforce communal norms).  
 63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 64. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Newspapers and TV Paint U.S. Action as Kind of Terrorism, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at B5 (describing the Arabic language media's negative depictions of 
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan); Fouad Ajami, What the Muslim World is Watching , N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. 48 (Nov. 18, 2001); Joel Campagna, Between Two Worlds: Qatar's Al-Jazeera  Satel-
lite Channel Faces Conflicting Expectations, available at 
http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2001/aljazeera_oct01/aljazeera_oct01.html (last visited on Nov. 2, 
2005) (reporting an Al Jazeera source's claim that "some people would put [on the air] what 
could be called inflammatory rhetoric or people with outrageous views"). 
 65. See Ajami, supra note 64, at 50. 
 66. See Campagna, supra note 64 (reporting on an Al Jazeera source's explanation that any 
bias at that network "did not stem from ill intent, but rather reflected the reporters' own back-
grounds and points of view"); CONTROL ROOM (Magnolia Pictures 2004) (documenting Al 
Jazeera's broadcasts of the Iraq War as reflecting the reporters' and producer's' own social and 
political understandings, despite their efforts to be "objective"). 
 67. See, e.g., Reviewing the Arab Press, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept. 1, 2004 (quoting an edi-
torial in a United Arab Emirates newspaper as stating that recent suicide attacks in Israel were 
a "simple response to the Zionist terrorism"); Hamas Leader Says Tel Aviv Blast Response to 
Israeli Terrorism, BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., Sept. 9, 2003 (quoting a Hamas leader as as-
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the international legal process, even if they are not accepted as formal 
law.68 
In sum, the media play a critical role in solidifying norms and 
understandings that already exist in the audience’s social fabrics.  In 
some instances, the codified norms may be recognized transnation-
ally, but, because the media are products of their own social and po-
litical environments, media from different environments may codify 
the same norms in different ways or may codify different norms alto-
gether.  In the latter instance, the codified norms play a role in the in-
ternational legal process even if they are not accepted formally as in-
ternational law. 
C. Invocation 
Invocation is the provisional characterization of an act as incon-
sistent with established law.69  The media help invoke the law primar-
ily by disseminating intelligence of incidents that breach communal 
understandings of justice.  When the Western media disseminate in-
telligence of human rights abuses, for example, they invoke (implic-
itly or explicitly) the international legal prohibitions against such 
abuses.70  This invocation is often accompanied by demands for a 
 
serting, on Al Jazeera television during an interview, that a recent suicide attack in Israel came 
"within the framework of the response to the Zionist terrorism which is being practised against 
the Palestinian people with US and European support"); Selection List: Iraqi Press 10 Dec. 02 , 
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Dec. 10, 2002 (quoting an editorial in an Iraqi newspaper as stat-
ing that the "real terrorism" is the "U.S.-Zionist terrorism"). 
 68. For a further discussion on the ways in which norms may constitute a "legal system," 
even if they are not recognized as formal law, see, for example, W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN 
BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999).  Professor Reisman explains: 
What must exist in order for us to speak of a legal system is not a formal enforcer but 
an expectation accompanying a belief that there is a "right" way to act, that someone, 
possibly even the injured party, may properly respond, in ways that might otherwise be 
improper, to infractions of that expectation.  It is this factor that helps sustain the 
norm.  The durability of norms through time is what makes law, including microlaw, 
significant in our lives. 
Id. at 13. 
 69. See Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 123. 
 70. See, e.g., Ethan Wilensky -Lanford, World Briefing Asia: Kyrgyzstan to Expel More Uz-
beks, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A10 (reporting that Kyrgyzstan would return to Uzbekistan 
survivors of a recent Uzbek Government crackdown, and quoting a Human Rights Watch re-
searcher as saying that "'[i]t is a violation of international law to return a person to a country 
that uses torture, and we know that Uzbekistan is such a country'"); David Rieff, The Precari-
ous Triumph of Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 9, 1999, at 36, 39  (quoting the Adv o-
cacy Director for Physicians for Human Rights as saying that "'[t]he only thing we really know 
how to do well is expose'"); Carroll Bogert, Human Rights Watch Communications Director, 
Remarks at the Yale Law School Symposium on Human Rights and the Media: Media Respon-
sibility and the Coverage of Human Rights (Apr. 1, 2000). 
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remedying response, but such demands are not always met.71  The 
process of invoking the law, however, is separate from the process of 
upholding or enforcing it.  Thus, even if the dissemination of intelli-
gence does not engender a response, the invocation remains.72 
D. Application 
Application involves using the law to analyze a particular inci-
dent or set of facts.73  The media help apply international law primar-
ily by communicating the analyses of other international actors.  For 
example, in advance of the July 1, 2004 transition to Iraqi sovereignty, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz appeared on PBS’s 
NewsHour to explain application of the law governing that process.74  
Similarly, after President Bush appeared before the U.N. General As-
sembly in September 2004 to defend his decision to enter Iraq, two 
former U.S. Government officials appeared on the NewsHour to dis-
cuss the legal norms applicable to that war.75 
Although when the media apply the law it is usually by commu-
nicating the analyses of other actors, the media sometimes attempt to 
apply the law themselves.  In some cases, the media may cultivate 
journalists who purport to have the expertise to apply international 
legal norms to particular fact patterns.76  In other cases, the media, 
 
 71. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN 
CONSCIENCE 97 (1998) ("There is nothing in the pictures of atrocity or suffering that automati-
cally engenders compassion or involvement.  Some pictures, some places engage us; others do 
not."); Rieff, supra note 70, at 39 (warning of the dangers of "compassion fatigue," and stating 
that "[y]ou can no longer build a political consensus for action, assuming you ever could, by 
showing yet another clip of disa ster pornography on television"). 
 72. Especially in the human rights context, the unpredictability of the international re-
sponse to an invocation by the media creates a double bind.  On the  one hand, by disseminating 
intelligence of violative behavior, the media increase the likelihood of an international response; 
public awareness of the incident may pressure international actors to demonstrate support (even 
if only verbal) for the violated rule and to call upon the responsible actors to cease their viola-
tion.  On the other hand, if the media's invocation fails to elicit an international response, that 
failure may suggest that the norm is not so binding or widespread as to govern would-be viola-
tors, and the over-invocation may thus contribute to the erosion of the law's authority. 
 73. Reisman, View from New Haven, supra note 2, at 123. 
 74. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Newsmaker: Paul Wolfowitz, (PBS television broa dcast, 
May 28, 2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/jan-
june04/wolfowitz_05-28.html. 
 75. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer,  Global Agenda , (PBS television broadcast, September 21, 
2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec04/global_9-21.html. 
 76. For example, Christiane Amanpour of CNN and Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek have 
earned reputations for international legal analysis.  In this sense, Amanpour and Zakaria may 
be distinguished from, for example, Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times because Ama n-
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and particularly the movie media, may apply current legal norms to 
historical or fictional fact patterns.  A number of movies, for example, 
have implicitly considered accounts of the Holocaust or other ethnic 
wars under the lens of the law prohibiting genocide.77 
In any event, the application process communicated through the 
media is intended for a mass audience and not for serious interna-
tional lawyers.  Thus, the analysis of applicable legal rules through or 
by the media tends not to address the intricacies of the issues, and 
tends to be simplified or incomplete. 
E. Termination 
A norm constitutes law only so long as it reflects communal ex-
pectations regarding authority, content and control.  Where those ex-
pectations change—where, in other words, the relevant community 
no longer attaches a source of authority and control to the policy con-
tent of the norm—the norm will cease to exist as binding law, and that 
cessation will be reflected in the behavior of international actors.  The 
termination process thus requires the dissolution of a set of expecta-
tions surrounding a particular legal principle.  The media function in 
this process much in the same way that they function in the prescrip-
tive one,78 as the dissolution of one set of expectations necessarily re-
quires the constitution of another. 
III.  THE MEDIA AND IMPERFECT ACTORS 
In Part II of this Article, I analyzed the positive functions that 
the media perform in the international legal process.  To varying ex-
tents, the media participate in the prescription, codification, applica-
tion, invocation, and termination of international law.  Moreover, 
media participation has essentially become indispensable.  The media 
fill the communicative gaps of the international system, and because 
of their unique expertise and relationships with the audience, they 
participate in the international legal process in ways that other actors 
do not and cannot. 
Yet the media do not perform their functions perfectly.  Rather, 
media performance is impeded by a variety of institutional, cultural, 
 
pour and Zakaria may themselves apply the law, whereas Greenhouse communicates the law as 
applied by a more conventional actor—the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 77. See, e.g., HOTEL RWANDA  (United Artists 2004); LIFE IS BEAUTIFUL (Miramax Enter-
tainment 1998); SCHINDLER'S LIST (Universal Studios 1993).  
 78. See supra notes 27-60 and accompanying text. 
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and practical factors.  In this Part, I consider some of the most preva-
lent factors that impede the media’s performance in the international 
legal process: controls on mediated messages, phenomenological bi-
ases among media actors, the institutionalized methods of news pro-
duction, and the potential for media “capture” to disseminate propa-
ganda.  Each of these factors may bias or distort legally relevant 
communications and thereby corrupt the international legal process. 
A. Controls on Mediated Messages 
The media are often impeded from performing their functions as 
a result of externally or internally imposed controls on media com-
munications.  All States impose some controls on the media operating 
within their territory.  Some States impose only limited controls, for 
example, with respect to the dissemination of licenses or the regula-
tion of broadcasts involving pornography or violence.79  Yet States 
that exercise considerable or total control over their media have 
available to them a variety of techniques for control, including intimi-
dation,80 censorship,81 and the development of technological barriers 
to media transmissions.82  These techniques impede the media from 
disseminating to their audiences messages that the State may find of-
fensive, and they thus bias the media reality in favor of the State-
preferred perspective. 
In addition to these techniques, which generally affect the me-
dia’s ability to transmit intelligence that they already have, States 
sometimes also impede the media from accessing that intelligence in 
 
 79. See MONROE E. PRICE, MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE GLOBAL INFORMATION 
REVOLUTION AND ITS CHALLENGE TO STATE POWER 18, 91 (2002). 
 80. See, e.g., ARTICLE 19,  NO COMMENT: CENSORSHIP, SECRECY AND THE IRISH 
TROUBLES 39 (1989) (noting that many journalists reporting on Northern Ireland "experienced 
violence or threats in the course of their duties"); Sam Dillon, Zedillo Lectures the Mexicans: 
Obey the Law , N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at A3 (discussing "the kidnapping of a journalist  . . . by 
what appeared to be plainclothes Government security agents" in Mexico). 
 81. See, e.g., ARTICLE 19, supra note 80, at 23-25 (discussing, for example, a 1988 United 
Kingdom ban on any discussion of five Republican paramilitary groups banned under antiter-
rorist legislation); Joseph Kahn, Let Freedom Ring?  Not So Fast.  China's Still China, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 2004, at A3 (discussing "China's still all-powerful censors and standard-setters"); 
Celia W. Dugger, Joining Sri Lanka's Sword: Might of Censor's Pen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000, 
at A3 ("[Sri Lanka's chief censor's] job is to purge criticism of the government's faltering war on 
separatist rebels from newspapers, radio and television."); Howard Schneider, In a Spin Over 
the Web; Cautious Arab States Confront Cha llenges of Unleashing Internet, WASH. POST, July 26, 
1999, at A13 (discussing internet censorship in the Muslim world). 
 82. See PRICE, supra note 79, at 17-18 ("[N]ew technologies can enhance as well as dimin-
ish [a State's] forms of control."); id. at 202 (discussing radio-jamming). 
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the first place.  State actors regularly engage in “information man-
agement,” or “spin,” to control the intelligence available to the me-
dia.83  This technique is particularly effective where the underlying in-
telligence is available exclusively to State actors, as may be the case 
(to varying degrees) with respect to issues of foreign policy, national 
security and international armed conflict.84  During the first Gulf War, 
for example, the Pentagon quite successfully managed the informa-
tion that the media disseminated by restricting media access to mili-
tary combat zones and recreating the Washington experience for re-
porters in Dhahran and Riyadh, with press briefings and pool 
reports.85  In this way, the Administration was able to control the me-
dia’s access to newsworthy information about the war.  As David Al-
theide explains: “[T]he war was covered, usually on the ‘sources’ 
terms because they supplied the visually dominating reports on which 
 
 83. See GANS, supra note 43, at 117 (explaining that as journalists try to extract information 
from their sources, the sources try to control the journalists' knowledge base). 
 84. The relationship between the U.S. Government and the media during periods of armed 
conflict has evolved over time.  During World War II, President Roosevelt saw both the infor-
mation and the entertainment media as essential to the war effort, and U.S. officials were quite 
open with members of the press.   See Becker, supra note 60, at B4.  The intimacy between the 
Government and the press was feasible then because of an understanding that the press would 
not print information that could impede the U.S. military efforts.  But, with the decline of the 
monopoly of the elite press corps over the news, the Government has learned to become more 
reserved.  The media, first enlisted to promote the war effort in Vietnam, eventually grew criti-
cal of tha t war and began releasing gruesome footage that sensitized the American public to the 
devastation of war.  See CARPENTER, supra note 33, at 166; Becker, supra note 60, at B5.  In-
deed, because many in the Government viewed the media as partially responsible for the loss of 
public support in Vietnam, the Government released almost no information about the subse-
quent U.S. invasion in Granada.  See CARPENTER, supra note 33, at 165-66.  The information 
disseminated during the first Gulf War was carefully managed, see infra notes 85-86 and accom-
panying text, and, in the second Gulf War, the Government embedded journalists into military 
units so that reporting could be conducted from U.S. front lines.  See David D. Kirkpatrick, 
News Industry Plans for War and Worries about Lost Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at C1 
("[M]ilitary officials have indicated a greater willingness than in Afghanistan or the previous 
Gulf War to let journalists cover the front, making preliminary arrangements for some reporters 
to travel 'embedded with troops.'").  For a discussion on media reporting during modern wars, 
see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND 191-96 (2000); id. at 196 
("Truth is always a casualty in war, but in virtual war, the media creates the illusion that what 
we are seeing is true."). 
 85. See David L. Altheide, Postjournalism Is Dead, Long Live Journalism!  The Gulf War 
in Perspective, CONTROLLING BROADCASTING: ACCESS, POLICY AND PRACTICE IN NORTH 
AMERICA AND EUROPE 134-65 (Fulbright Papers vol. 13) (Meryl Aldridge & Nicholas Hewitt 
eds., 1994); CHRIS HEDGES, WAR IS A FORCE THAT GIVES US MEANING 23 (2002) ("[During 
the Gulf War] the international press willingly administered a restrictive pool system on behalf 
of the military under which carefully controlled groups of reporters were guided around the 
front lines by officers."). 
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TV news formats thrive.  News organisations covered the war even 
when they knew they were being misled systematically  . . . .”86 
Apart from the controls imposed by States on the media, the 
media sometimes impose controls on themselves, for example, to pre-
serve their relationships with useful sources or to satisfy commercial 
interests.  Journalists who regularly depend on official sources may, in 
the interest of ensuring a future flow of information, choose not to 
disseminate intelligence that their sources would rather keep out of 
the public sphere.87  In a similar vein, media enterprises may choose 
not to disseminate intelligence out of a more general respect for the 
host government.  When Katherine Graham was President of the 
Washington Post, she reportedly assured a group of recruits for the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that she believed “democracy flour-
ishes when the government can take legitimate steps to keep its se-
crets and when the press can decide whether to print what it knows.”88  
More recently, U.S. television news broadcasters decided not to air 
videotapes delivered by Osama bin Laden after September 11, 2001, 
on the basis of the Administration’s characterization of those tapes as 
potentially containing sensitive or suspect information.89 
In addition, the media may control the structure or substance of 
their communications for commercial interests.90  Structurally, the 
need to generate advertising revenues may compel a medium to inter-
sperse intelligence that relates to the national and global orders with 
“fluff” pieces or advertisements.  The networks’ evening news pro-
grams, for example, tend to devote thirty seconds to three minutes on 
a major international event and then break for two minutes of com-
mercials.  This affects the significance that the viewers, consciously or 
not, attribute to the event.  Substantively, commercial interests may 
either encourage the media to avoid topics from which their audience 
may feel disengaged or to increase the entertainment content in order 
to attract a wider audience.91 
 
 86. Altheide, supra note 85, at 141; see also IGNATIEFF, supra note 84, at 196 ("In the Gulf 
War . . . movement of journalists was used successfully to control their reporting."). 
 87. See GANS, supra note 43, at 116-17; CARPENTER, supra note 33, at 5. 
 88. ALEXANDER COCKBURN & JEFFREY ST. CLAIRE, WHITEOUT: THE CIA, DRUGS AND 
THE PRESS 31 (1998). 
 89. See Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, The Coverage: Networks Agree to U.S. Request to 
Edit Future bin Laden Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at A1. 
 90. For an argument that the capitalist interests of the mass media have deteriorated the 
informational quality of the public sphere, see generally HABERMAS, supra note 3. 
 91. WAR PHOTOGRAPHER (Christian Frei 2001) (noting that many media shirk away from 
images and stories that might depress or distance their audiences); David Gelber, Executive 
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In sum, the variety of controls on media communications—
whether externally or internally imposed—impede media perform-
ance by resulting in the dissemination of biased or inaccurate infor-
mation or in the failure to disseminate valuable information.  In all 
instances, such controls may corrupt the international legal process. 
B. Phenomenological Biases 
The media are also impeded from performing optimally as a re-
sult of the inherent cultural biases that pervade their work.  As dis-
cussed above, the media are products of their own social and political 
environments, and their constructions of reality reflect personal, pro-
fessional and cultural biases.92  Indeed, it is by reflecting cultural bi-
ases that the media function to help codify communal norms, but the 
“underbelly” of this function is that the phenomenological biases may 
render media communications incomplete or inaccurate.  This is evi-
dent from the discussion above with respect to the Arabic-language 
media, which tend to reinforce the audience’s phenomenological bi-
ases against the United States and Israel without necessarily question-
ing or challenging those biases.93 
As a general matter, media communications reflect the phe-
nomenological biases that exist among media actors themselves, in 
terms of the value and reality judgments that media actors make 
when selecting what to report and how to report it.  To the extent that 
media actors make those judgments without scrutinizing their phe-
nomenological biases, the media reality will reinforce those biases 
among members of the audience, especially among those who lack 
any firsthand experience of the issue (which tends to be the case with 
respect to international issues).94  As a result, the incomplete and bi-
 
Producer of CBS News, Remarks at the Yale Law School Symposium on Human Rights and the 
Media: Using the Media for Human Rights Advocacy (Mar. 31, 2000) (describing the consumer 
surveys that media enterprises undertake to cater to mass preferences). 
 92. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
 94. Audience members generally process media communications through their own ex-
periences, and a viewer with firsthand experience of the subject is more likely to reject messages 
that fail to comport with his or her own experiences.  See DAVISON, supra note 56, at 28-29; 
John Tomlinson, Cultural Globalization and Cultural Imperialism, in INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNICATION AND GLOBALIZATION 170, 181 (Ali Mohammadi ed., 1997) ("[W]e should 
not only avoid the rather patronizing attitude towards cultural agents that sees them as passive 
terminus of a flow of cultural influence, we should also be able to see that there is in fact never a 
simple 'delivery' of cultural influence."). 
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ased media reality becomes the operative reality of the viewing audi-
ence. 
C. Methods of News Production 
Media performance is further impeded by certain methods of 
news production.  In the United States, news production with respect 
to global events has, for the most part, become a collective process 
such that most information is obtained from a small sampling of 
sources.  This is often done by way of official statements or press con-
ferences.95  When such information is obtained by other means, it 
tends to be processed by one of the four major wire services because 
only a few news organizations maintain extensive foreign bureaus.96  
As a result of this institutionalized process of news production, inac-
curate or incomplete information gathered or disseminated by the 
original source will be repeated by a variety of news media, thereby 
incorrectly enforcing its signal of authority. 
Moreover, all news media tend to simplify global events into 
truncated “news stories” that lose the details and intricacies of the 
event97 and that often seek to entertain as much as, if not more than, 
they seek to educate or inform.98  This tendency to simplify global 
events has, in recent years, been exacerbated by the 24-hour news cy-
cle because the time pressure to deliver news reduces the time for 
 
 95. See, e.g., TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A 
POLITICAL INSTITUTION 71 (1998); FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 79 (1995); GANS, supra note 43, at 116 (explaining that journalists actively pursue only 
a handful of regular sources). 
 96. WEBSTER, supra note 95, at 79 (noting that ninety percent of international news in the 
United States comes from one of the four major news agencies—United Press International, 
Associated Press, Reuters, and Agence France Presse).  
 97. See GANS, supra note 43, at 162; EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE 4 
(1973) (quoting Reuven Frank, the initiator of NBC's nightly news program, as instructing his 
staff about the essence of a news story: "Every news story should, without sacrifice of probity or 
responsibility, display the  attributes of fiction, of drama"); Michael W. Reisman, A Jurispru-
dence from the Perspective of the "Political Superior" , 23 N. KY. L. REV. 605, 614 (1996) 
("Viewers of the mass media in advanced industrial systems perceive selected events presented 
as 'cause' and selected events presented as their 'effect' as a relatively straight-forward and un-
nuanced sequence and in an unusual, if not wholly unreal, physical and temporal proximity."); 
Gelber, supra note 91 (contending that the "fictionalization" of news persists in the production 
of television news today). 
 98. See, e.g., Robert C.L. Moffat, Mustering the Moxie to Master the Media Mess: Some In-
troductory Comments in the Quest for Media Responsibility, 9 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 
146 (1998) (discussing the transformation of the news media into entertainment). 
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analysis and sourcing.99  The tendency to reconfigure information into 
a (more or less entertaining) “story” results, not only in the manipula-
tion of information, but also in the under-dissemination of stagnant 
political problems for which there are no “beginnings” or “ends.” 
To be sure, there are exceptions to these trends.  For example, 
newspapers continue to address issues in greater depth and range 
than television news programs, and, among television news programs, 
PBS’s NewsHour is noticeably more thorough in its content and 
sourcing.100  Nevertheless, to the extent that the trends exist, they dis-
tort the media reality, and thus the reality as understood by the view-
ing public. 
D. Propaganda 
Finally, and perhaps most notoriously, the media corrupt the in-
ternational legal process when they are “captured” by propagandists.  
The line between propaganda and “spin” is a fuzzy one, but propa-
ganda may be defined as communications intended to influence the 
audience’s response with respect to the message or subject of the 
communication.101  Propaganda varies significantly in terms of the 
manner in which it is produced and in terms of its intensity and ef-
fects, but all propaganda presents the risk of biasing legally relevant 
communications.  Despite these risks, it would be overly simplistic to 
assert that all propaganda is necessarily harmful or undesirable.  To 
the contrary, the use of propaganda may be desirable, for example, to 
the extent it can be used to peacefully bring about positive changes in 
the world arena.102 
That said, propaganda might also be used to produce harmful 
outcomes.  The paradigmatic case of such harmful propaganda is the 
Nazi Party’s use of the radio media—which Hitler referred to as “a 
terrible weapon in the hands of those who know how to make use of 
 
 99. See PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE STATE 
OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2005, at 5, http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2005/execsum.pdf (last visited 
July 23, 2005). 
 100. PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, OVERVIEW (CONTENT ANALYSIS), THE 
STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2005, 
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2005/narrative_overview_contentanalysis.asp?cat=2&media=1 
(last visited July 21, 2005). 
 101. I derive this definition from B.S. Murty.  See MURTY, supra note 5, at 7; see also 
HAROLD LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1934) (cited in BARAN & 
DAVIS, supra note 3, at 74-75) (defining propaganda in terms of the manipulation of communi-
cations to bring about mass actions or beliefs). 
 102. See MURTY, supra note 5, at 82. 
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it”—as part of a broader, tightly integrated propaganda machine.103  
As the Nazi’s master propagandist, Joseph Goebbels, explained to the 
heads of German radio stations: 
I believe radio to be the most modern and most important instru-
ment of mass influence . . . .  Radio must rally together 100% of the 
people.  And once we have them, radio must hold this 100%, must 
defend them, and must so thoroughly indoctrinate them that none 
can break away.104 
More recently, the radio and print media were used to exacerbate la-
tent tensions between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups in Rwanda 
and to contribute to the 1994 genocide in that country.105  The broad-
casts of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) were par-
ticularly powerful because television media were essentially non-
existent in Rwanda, and because, with the exception of government-
run Radio Rwanda, RTLM was the only available radio station in the 
region.106  Moreover, because RTLM was next to Radio Rwanda on 
the dial, RTLM communications were sometimes broadcast over the 
government frequency, thus giving them an air of authority107  In this 
environment, the media were a powerful tool with which to manipu-
late latent prejudices, emotions and belief systems in Rwanda. 
IV.  MEDIA ENVIRONMENTS 
In Part II of this Article, I described the positive functions that 
the media (as mass communicators) perform in the international legal 
process.  Yet, as I discussed in Part III, the media do not perform 
those functions perfectly.  Rather, they are impeded by a variety of 
systemic factors.  These include controls on mediated messages, phe-
nomenological biases among media actors, the methods of news pro-
 
 103. JULIAN HALE, RADIO POWER: PROPAGANDA AND INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING 
1-9 (1975). 
 104. Joseph Goebbels, Ansprache an die Intendanten und Direktoren der Rundfunkgesell-
schaften [Speech to the Directors of the Radio Broadcast Companies] (Mar. 25, 1933), in 1 
GOEBBELS-REDEN, 1932-1939, at 82, 91-92 (Helmut Heiber ed., 1971) (translated by Kevin S. 
Blume). 
 105. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR -99-52-T, Judgment (Dec. 3, 2003) (finding 
two founders of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines and the editor-in-chief of the news-
paper Kangura guilty of numerous counts of genocide); Gregory S. Gordon, "A War of Media, 
Words, Newspapers and Radio Stations": The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in 
the International Law of Hate Speech, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 139 (2004); Recent Cases: The Media 
Case, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2769 (2004); Dina Temple -Raston, Radio Hate, LEGAL AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 2002, at 30. 
 106. See Temple-Raston, supra note 105, at 30. 
 107. Id. 
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duction, and the use of the media for propaganda.  To varying de-
grees, these factors contribute to the dissemination of inaccurate, bi-
ased, or manipulated communications, and to the extent these com-
munications are legally relevant, they may also contribute to the 
corruption of the international legal process.  In light of all this, two 
questions arise: in what conditions do the media perform optimally, 
and how might those conditions be fostered? 
With respect to the first question, it seems clear that, as a general 
matter, the media best perform their legal functions when they oper-
ate in a liberal media environment—where a variety of media com-
pete for the audience’s attention, and the media are, for the most 
part, free from external controls and committed to minimizing inter-
nal controls.108  This sort of environment finds support in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that “[e]veryone 
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression,” including the 
rights “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers.”109  The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights thus supports a liberal media environment as an end in 
itself.  Media communications contribute to the audience’s enlight-
enment, and there is, therefore, inherent value in an environment in 
which there is wide access to the shaping and sharing of media mes-
sages. 
Such an environment is also desirable from the perspective of 
minimizing the systemic factors that impede the media in the per-
formance of their international legal functions.  Where there is wide 
access, in terms of both the communicator and the audience, there is a 
decreased likelihood of the media collectively being limited by con-
trols, phenomenological biases, methods of news production, or of 
their communicating propaganda with harmful effects.  This is not to 
say that the media will never be impeded by such factors.  The media 
environment in the United States is quite liberal, but, as discussed in 
Part III, it is not free from such impediments.  Rather, although in 
liberal environments the media are free to produce poorly sourced or 
inaccurate communications, or communications that lack rigor in 
analysis, such environments also enable other media to cancel out 
such communications—by revealing the biases of such communica-
 
 108. I derive this understanding of the optimal media policy from B.S. Murty.  See MURTY, 
supra note 5, at 77-78, 287. 
 109. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 1st plen, mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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tions or maintaining independent commitments to thorough and ac-
curate reporting. 
Thus, as a general matter, media operating in liberal environ-
ments are unlikely to communicate propaganda with harmful effects 
because, in such environments, propagandistic communications are 
likely to be offset by other media communications.110  Yet any propa-
ganda that correlates with imminently harmful outcomes should be 
controlled.  (In these limited cases, the interest against such propa-
ganda outweighs the interest against State-imposed controls on media 
communications because of the imminent harmful outcomes of the 
propaganda.)  There can be no bright-line rule as to when media 
communications will correlate with imminently harmful outcomes.111  
Particular communications must be considered in context.  That is, 
they must be considered in light of the intents and capabilities of the 
communicator(s), the expectations and responses of the audience, 
and whether audience members will be favorably disposed to the 
message of the communication.112  In Rwanda, for example, a number 
of factors contributed to RTLM’s harmful effects, including the latent 
tensions between Tutsi and Hutu groups, the relative lack of alterna-
tive media, and the appearance that RTLM operated under the au-
thority of the government.113 
Although the international community has indicated support for 
liberal media environments in general terms, it has succeeded neither 
in establishing such environments nor in setting forth aspirational 
standards.  Rather, to the extent that the international community has 
tried to legislate in this area, it has focused only on transborder com-
munications and has been unable to square the interest in a liberal 
media environment with the preservation of State sovereignty over its 
internal media space. 
The failure to resolve this tension is apparent in a number of in-
ternational instruments addressing media communications.  For in-
stance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) provides that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression,” which includes the right to “impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
 
 110. See MURTY, supra note 5, at 78. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 7, 44. 
 113. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text. 
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print, in the form of art, or through any other media.”114  Yet the 
Covenant then subjects that right to any restrictions necessary for 
(among other things) the “respect of the rights or reputations of oth-
ers,” or for the protection of “public health or morals.”115  The 
ICCPR thus gives a State quite a bit of leeway to restrict media com-
munications that it finds undesirable. 
Similarly, the mass media declaration issued by the United Na-
tions Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO)  
endorsed both the “free flow” of information and the “wider and 
more balanced dissemination of information.” 116  The latter standard 
was intended to shield developing States from the strong influences of 
the Western media,117 and UNESCO’s implication in its declaration 
and subsequently that the interest in a “wider and more balanced dis-
semination of information” might warrant restricting the “free flow” 
of information caused significant controversy and ultimately contrib-
uted to the U.S. Government’s decision to withdraw from the organi-
zation.118  The international community, then, has not succeeded in 
resolving the tension between the interest in the free flow of media 
communications and the interest in preserving State sovereignty over 
internal media space.119 
 
 114. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).  
 115. Id. at art. 19(3).  Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights provides in full: 
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities.  It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals. 
 116. General Conference of UNESCO, Oct.-Nov. 1968, Declaration on Mass Media , art IX, 
UNESCO Doc. 20C/20 Rev. (Nov. 21, 1978). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See generally Micha el J. Farley, Comment, Conflicts over Government Control of In-
formation—The United States and UNESCO, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1071 (1985).  
 119. Another poignant example of the international community's failure to resolve the ten-
sion between the free flow of information and State sovereignty over internal media space is the 
(failed) international effort to regulate the use of direct satellite television broadcasting.  During 
the multilateral discussions on this issue, three basic positions developed.  The first position fo-
cused on the interest of States to define their own cultural and communication policies without 
interference from foreign actors, and argued for a regime in which the host State's consent 
would be required for any transnational satellite transmissions.  The second position focused on 
the interest in the robust freedoms of speech and expression, and argued against State control of 
any outgoing or incoming satellite transmissions.  The third position sought compromise be-
tween the other two, and sought to resolve the tension largely on the basis of bilateral agree-
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To some extent, particular States have resolved this tension 
through bilateral or even multilateral negotiations with other States 
or with media enterprises.  For instance, the European Television 
without Frontiers Directive essentially provides for the free flow of 
transborder communications, except where one member State hosts 
programs that significantly impair the moral development of children 
in another member State, in which case the Directive requires bilat-
eral consultations.120  Similarly, information ministers of the Gulf Co-
operation Council have mediated disputes between Qatar, which 
hosts Al Jazeera, and Bahrain arising out of Bahrain’s assertion that 
Al Jazeera’s broadcasts violate the public order.121  And China nego-
tiated with Star-TV to give that media enterprise access to the 
Chinese market, but, in exchange for such access, Star-TV was 
prohibited from carrying the BBC.122 
Negotiations between States or between one State and a media 
enterprise may result in fewer controls being imposed on media 
communications than if the host State acted unilaterally to close its 
media space to all foreign media.  But these context-specific negotia-
tions do not on their own create liberal media environments and, in 
any event, are not comprehensive. 
In the absence of any such comprehensive regime, liberal media 
environments can be fostered through other means.  States may work 
unilaterally to bring about these conditions.  For instance, States may 
limit the controls they impose on the content of media communica-
tions in their own territories and work to expand media options in 
other States, especially those with closed or restrictive media markets.  
States have a variety of tools to affect the media markets in other 
States. These range from subsidizing or sponsoring media that broad-
cast into such markets to supporting the development of technologies 
that circumvent host State controls, and even to blocking media 
communications that directly correlate with violence.123  The appro-
priate tool in any given situation would, of course, depend on the par-
ticular social and political environment of the host State. 
To the extent that States, working together or unilaterally, suc-
ceed in liberalizing media environments, such liberalization will cur-
 
ments between sending and receiving countries.  See CEES J. HAMELINK, THE POLITICS OF 
WORLD COMMUNICATION 140-43 (1994). 
 120. PRICE, supra note 79, at 22. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 188-89. 
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tail but not eliminate the factors that impede the media’s perform-
ance of their functions in the international legal process.  As noted 
above, the factors that impede this performance exist even in liberal 
media environments like the one in the United States.  In these envi-
ronments, the media themselves are, for the most part, responsible 
for their performance. 
Thus, if we are to see changes in the way the media perform their 
international legal functions, they must come from the media them-
selves.  The media, for example, must take steps to overcome phe-
nomenological biases, double-check the accuracy of source material, 
provide thorough and comprehensive news coverage, and avoid er-
rors or misstatements.  To some extent, news media enterprises in the 
West already take such measures,124 not only out of a sense of profes-
sional integrity, but also because the vibrant media environment in 
the West contains certain checks on the dissemination of misinforma-
tion or on the failure to disseminate information.  As discussed above, 
however, there is significant room for improvement, even among 
news media enterprises in the West. 
CONCLUSION 
The international legal process is characterized by significant 
communicative gaps that the media (as mass communicators) help fill.  
As I discussed in Part II of this Article, the media perform functions 
at every stage of the legal process.  With respect to lawmaking, the 
media help establish both the parameters of the lawmaking process 
and the audience’s expectations concerning the policy content, au-
thority and control of the legal norms.  The media also play roles, to 
varying degrees, in the codification, application, invocation and ter-
mination of international legal norms. 
Although the media perform indispensable functions in the in-
ternational legal process, their performance is sometimes impeded by 
one of a number of systemic factors.  States may try to reduce the 
prevalence of such factors in their own media spaces by sustaining 
liberal media environments—where a variety of media compete for 
the audience’s attention, and the media are, for the most part, free 
from external controls—and may work unilaterally to liberalize the 
media spaces of other States. 
 
 124. See, e.g., The Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, available at 
http://spj.org/ethics_code.asp (last visited November 2, 2005). 
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Yet there is only so much that States can do.  Ultimately, it is up 
to the media themselves to transcend the factors that impair the in-
ternational legal process and to take responsibility for their legally 
relevant communications.  At least among the Western news media, 
this is not likely to happen in the absence of commercial incentives.  
Rather, given their unique expertise and relationships with the audi-
ence, the media are likely to continue operating in the international 
legal process as they do now—performing important functions but 
not performing those functions perfectly.  In the final analysis, other 
actors must recognize both the functions and the limits of the media 
in the international legal process.  The failure to recognize the me-
dia’s functions would constrict our understanding of the international 
legal process and thus our ability to achieve desirable community 
policies; the failure to recognize the media’s limits would risk imple-
menting policies that are based on misunderstood realities. 
